Commentary
In their Commentary, Carlsson, Schimmack, Williams, and Bürkner (2017) criticize our analysis of hotel towel reuse (Scheibehenne, Jamil, & Wagenmakers, 2016) because we collapsed data across different studies. In addition, Carlsson et al. apply a random-effects model and argue that allegedly minor changes in the parameter priors render the evidence inconclusive. These are two separate issues, and we will address each of them in turn.
Collapsing Data Is Not "Inherently Flawed"
Simpson's paradox describes a situation in which the association between two variables changes when conditioning on a third, such as gender, group membership, or other subpopulations within the data (Pearl, 2014) . 1 Carlsson et al. argue that researchers should always control for such subpopulations if the analysis is potentially vulnerable to Simpson's paradox; hence, they consider our original approach of pooling the data across studies "inherently flawed" (p. 1). Controlling for third variables may often be worthwhile, but the decision relies on theoretical considerations, not on statistical criteria or rules of thumb (e.g., Arah, 2008; Pearl, 2014) . Even for Carlsson et al.'s Berkeley example, Pearl (2009) showed that depending on the context (i.e., selective application patterns of qualified and unqualified candidates), a pooled analysis provides an unbiased result, whereas conditioning on college wrongly indicates a gender bias even if the colleges did not discriminate.
Nevertheless, our decision to pool the data was guided by pragmatic considerations and the fact that these were replication studies. It would have been prudent to make an informed choice, and we agree with Carlsson et al. that in the case at hand a disaggregated approach is more appropriate. Note that the primary goal of our work was to demonstrate how Bayesian techniques can be used to quantify and continually update evidence as new studies appear. The concepts of Bayesian evidence synthesis are entirely general and do not depend on the details of the statistical model or how the data were combined.
Fixed-Effect or Random-Effects Model?
Carlsson et al. suggest that our data required a randomeffects model to allow heterogeneity across studies. However, the random-effects model is more complex than the fixed-effect model that assumes no heterogeneity. As mentioned in our original article, we felt that with only seven data points, the more complex randomeffects model would overfit the data (e.g., Myung, 2000) . This may seem at odds with the common recommendation in the meta-analysis literature to adopt random-effects models by default, as the fixed-effect assumption is a priori unlikely to hold (e.g., Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2010) . However, this recommendation has recently been challenged on theoretical grounds (Rice, Higgins, & Lumley, 2017) . Also, information theory indicates that with only few data, the key goals of prediction and model generalizability are often better served by using simpler models, even when these models are known from the outset to be , and Eric-Jan Wagenmakers "wrong" (e.g., Grünwald, Myung, & Pitt, 2005) . In line with this insight and with established practices (e.g., Albert & Chib, 1997; Moreno, Vázquez-Polo, & Negrín, 2017; Sutton & Abrams, 2001 ), we conducted a Bayesian model comparison to test which model better predicted the observed data. The tested models were similar to those used by µ ~ N(0, 0. 3)-but in line with the directional hypothesis that social norms increase towel reuse, we implemented a one-sided test. More important, this also allowed a closer comparison with the results from our original one-sided analysis. In contrast, Carlsson et al. conducted a less informative twosided test that almost halved the reported Bayes factors and thus inflated the differences between their results and ours. We consider this a modeling oversight.
Our Bayesian model comparison involves the fixedeffect model without heterogeneity and a range of random-effects models that differ in the extent to which they predict heterogeneity (i.e., models with a more diffuse prior on τ predict more heterogeneity). Thus, the approach encompasses the models contrasted by Carlsson et al. Figure 1 displays the results obtained through bridge sampling (Meng & Wong, 1996) . 2 The upper panel shows that the fixed-effect model (white diamonds) yields strong evidence for the effectiveness of social norms (Bayes factor favoring the alternative over the null hypothesis, or BF 10 = 24). For the randomeffects models (white triangles), the evidence for the alternative hypothesis decreases as the models assume more between-studies heterogeneity. This replicates Carlsson et al.'s findings. Crucially, however, the comparison reveals that the fixed-effect model dominates the random-effects models (black squares), and increasingly so as the latter assume more heterogeneity. In other words, random-effects models with diffuse priors on τ may yield different results from the fixed-effect model, but these random-effects models are overly complex and do not generalize well. The simple fixedeffect model predicts the observed data best.
The disparate results can be reconciled in a Bayesian model-averaging approach that weights the models' estimated effect sizes with their respective posterior probabilities (e.g., Gronau et al., 2017; Hoeting, Madigan, Raftery, & Volinsky, 1999; Moreno et al., 2017) .
3 This approach has the advantage of avoiding the discrete choice for any particular model, and it accounts for uncertainty about which single model is best suited to predict the data (Sutton & Abrams, 2001) . The upper panel of Figure 1 shows the results of this model as gray circles, indicating consistent evidence for the alternative over the null hypothesis (BF 10 ≈ 15) irrespective of the assumptions regarding between-studies variance. Although quantitatively lower, the findings are qualitatively consistent with our original results. The lower panel of Figure 1 shows the corresponding posterior log odds ratios for both models and the weighted estimate (based on a two-sided analysis). Again, this weighted estimate most closely resembled the fixedeffect model. The results were robust to the choice of alternative (informed) priors. 4 
Concluding Comments
Carlsson et al. did not show that our approach was "inherently flawed," but they did show that the interpretation of empirical data depends on the statistical lens employed. As we anticipated in our original article, the lenses proposed by Carlsson et al. are overly the between-studies variance τ, separately for three models comparing the alternative hypothesis (H1) with the null hypothesis (H0) and the model comparing the fixed-effect and random-effects models. The lower panel shows posterior log odds ratios as a function of prior values on the between-studies variance τ and model type. Error bars are 95% highest-posterior-density intervals. In the upper panel, the dashed line at 1 indicates no evidence for either hypothesis, and the dashed line at 3 marks the cutoff below which evidence for H1 is sometimes considered "hardly worth mentioning" (Jeffreys, 1961, p. 432). complex and are contraindicated by the data. Viewed constructively, the debate highlights the hidden uncertainty associated with the selection of statistical models ( Jeffreys, 1961; Silberzahn & Uhlmann, 2015) . Here, we showed how this uncertainty can be accounted for by Bayesian model averaging, which produces relatively constant evidence in favor of the effectiveness of social norms. If new data are included in the future, it is expected that the random-effects model will receive higher weight and hence will increasingly drive the outcome. We believe Bayesian model averaging is a promising tool for meta-analysis and for reconciling statistical disagreement.
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